‡ow. These results are robust to controls for the operational, investment, and …nancing determinants of cash holdings and controls for unobserved …rm-and year-…xed e¤ects. To explore the roles of the free cash ‡ow and …nancing channels in these changes in cash policies, we provide cross-sectional evidence of di¤ering e¤ects for …rms characterized by weaker pre-reform governance arrangements and by tighter …nancial constraints.
We …nd greater reductions in cash holdings in …rms in which governance is weaker before the reform; our governance measures are monitoring from other large (noncontrolling) shareholders and the extent of relatedparty transactions between controlling shareholders and the listed company; more related-party transactions indicate weaker governance. This e¤ect is consistent with an agency-induced free cash ‡ow channel from governance to cash holdings. We also …nd greater reductions in cash holdings in …rms that would otherwise face tighter …nancial constraints (e.g., younger and smaller …rms); this e¤ect is consistent with an indirect …nancing channel from governance to cash holdings.
We also examine whether the e¤ects of the reform di¤er between state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and privately owned …rms. Di¤erences in cash management policy responses between private …rms and SOEs are not unexpected given the special characteristics of controlling shareholders of SOEs, who are themselves government agencies, as opposed to the persons or families who are controlling shareholders of private …rms.
The nature of both corporate governance and agency con ‡icts in SOEs is shaped by the existence of the controlling shareholder's government-agency objective function, including substantial nonprice considerations, for example, a wish to meet certain political and social welfare objectives (e.g., Shleifer 1998); in addition, the incentive and opportunity for a government agency to regard an SOE's cash as a fund for its own needs is diminished by the fact that the agency is not a person or a family but rather an organization with its own system of internal controls (e.g., Lin, Cai, and Li 1998) . Controlling shareholders of private …rms, in contrast, would in general not be expected to have political and social welfare objectives but would instead be expected to focus on maximizing returns, including the private returns associated with viewing corporate cash as a means to meet their own needs. Consistent with this di¤erence in perspectives between controlling shareholders of SOEs and private …rms, we …nd that the reduction in cash holdings is larger in privately owned …rms than in state-owned …rms. However, both groups experience similar degrees of reduction in cash savings rates.
To shed light on the relative importance of the free cash ‡ow channel and the …nancial constraints channel for private …rms and SOEs, we analyze post-share-reform dividend payout, and borrowing and investing behaviors, as well as investor valuation of corporate cash holdings. We predict that …rms more a¤ected by the free cash ‡ow channel would be expected to increase cash payouts relatively more and …rms more a¤ected by the …nancial constraints channel would be expected to increase borrowing and capital investment more. We …nd that private …rms increase dividend payouts but not capital investment, whereas SOEs increase dividends, but not as much as private …rms, and SOEs also increase capital investment and short-term borrowings. We also …nd evidence that the market valuation of cash holdings increased after the share reform, more so for SOEs than for private …rms. Taken together, these …ndings indicate that although both private …rms and SOEs reduced cash holdings after the share reform, the reductions of cash holdings in private …rms are more a¤ected by the free cash ‡ow channel and the reductions of cash holdings in SOEs are more a¤ected by the …nancial constraint channel. These …ndings are consistent with the perspective that corporate insiders'ability to make personal use of corporate assets, including cash, was relatively more constrained in SOEs because their controlling owners are organizations with their own systems of internal controls.
Our research design assumes that the reform represents an exogenous shock to …rms'governance systems, and that it a¤ected only the exchangeability of previously nontradable shares, with no e¤ects on (exogenously given) operating, …nancing, and investment opportunities that are unrelated to governance. Although we regard these assumptions as plausible, we also take steps to validate them and address alternative explanations. We …nd that our results are robust after controlling for the possibility that …rms may have (limited) discretion in their choice of the reform timing. We also eliminate sample …rms that undertook major restructurings or operational reorganizations during the reform period to ensure that the operations/business models of the sample …rms are not changed concomitant with the reform. Finally, we …nd that the reduction in cash holdings is strongest in …rms whose controlling shareholders' holdings are low, and that the sensitivity of cash holdings to cash ‡ow is signi…cantly reduced only in …rms whose governance arrangements were weakest before the reform. These results are inconsistent with the alternative explanation that reduced cash holdings following the reform are due to exogenous, non-governance-related factors that a¤ect …nancial constraints. Our …ndings of an average increase in capital expenditures and in the stock market valuation of cash after the reform are also inconsistent with the explanation that the reduced level of cash holdings is due to exogenous, negative shocks to investment opportunities.
Our paper belongs to the broad literature on the e¤ects of corporate governance and contributes specifically to the literature on the determinants of cash holdings. Because cash can account for over one-…fth of corporate assets 1 and cash management in general has substantial consequences (see, e.g., Fresard 2010), understanding how corporate governance a¤ects cash holdings can shed light on one of the channels through which governance arrangements a¤ect …rm value (Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 2003) . From a methodological perspective, our paper contributes by identifying a setting in which …rms experience an exogenous shock to their governance systems, enabling us to identify the causal e¤ect of governance on cash holdings. Our setting avoids the inference problems arising from the concern that both cash holdings and corporate governance arrangements can be endogenous responses to forces in …rms'operating environments that are unobservable to researchers. Prior literature has relied on cross-country settings to minimize the impact of endogeneity at the …rm level by studying the e¤ect of country-level investor protection on …rms'cash policies (e.g., Durnev and Kim 2005; Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz 2007) ; however, these studies are subject to the concern that the level of investor protection is often correlated with other country characteristics that are di¢ cult to control for. Our setting avoids the problem of correlated omitted variables by using a one-country design.
In addition to these identi…cation advantages, we also believe that our research setting should increase the power of our tests for three reasons. First, the ownership structures of Chinese-listed …rms in the pre-reform period were arguably exogenously speci…ed as part of the IPO arrangements, and the trading restrictions imposed on controlling shareholders before the reform would e¤ectively preclude more than a very modest partial adjustment to changes in the economic environment. Second, China is characterized by weak shareholder protection, so the e¤ects of governance changes that bene…t minority shareholders should be relatively more pronounced and therefore easier to detect. Third, cash holdings are very important to Chinese-listed companies because Chinese …nancial markets are relatively underdeveloped. 2 The overall weak protection a¤orded Chinese minority investors makes it possible for controlling shareholders to control the listed company's cash and, if needed, to divert the cash to their own uses by related-party transactions and similar arrangements (see, e.g., Jian and Wong 2010; Jiang, Lee, and Yue 2010) . This e¤ect is exacerbated by the nontradability of controlling shareholders'shares; they cannot exchange their shares for cash, so they have an even stronger incentive to require the entities they control to hold cash, for their own cash needs. We believe that the importance of cash in the Chinese corporate setting implies that the e¤ects of governance changes on cash holdings should be substantial and readily detectable.
Our paper also contributes by highlighting the interaction between the operational and agency motivations for holding cash, in that governance arrangements a¤ect cash holdings directly (the free cash ‡ow channel) and indirectly through the …nancial constraints channel. In contrast, previous research on corporate cash holdings focuses on either operational or agency considerations. The operational considerations literature emphasizes the e¤ects of investment opportunities and …nancial constraints (e.g., Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson 1999; Faulkender and Wang 2006; Bates, Kahle, and Stulz 2009; Denis and Sibilkov 2009; Duchin 2010) , and suggests that cash holdings prevent underinvestment in desirable projects by managers who wish to increase share values. The agency considerations literature (e.g., Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, and Servaes 2003; Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson 2006; Kalcheva and Lins 2007; Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith 2007; Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell 2008) suggests that ample cash holdings facilitate overinvestment in undesirable projects or outright misappropriation.
Lastly, our study extends research on the split share structure reform itself. For example, Lin (2009) …nds that related-party transactions decline in both frequency and amount after the reform, and interprets this reduction as consistent with the view that the reform reduced agency con ‡icts, speci…cally, con ‡icts that induced tunneling in the form of related-party transactions. In the context of our study, her results support our use of related-party transactions as an indicator of corporate governance, and suggest that when the reform reduced market frictions, governance improved. Like Lin (2009), we examine a real e¤ect of the reform, and …nd that reform is associated with improved outcomes, in the form of lower cash holdings and higher market valuations of cash holdings. Two recent studies also examine the reform process itself. Li et al. (2011) hypothesize and …nd that the compensation paid by controlling shareholders to minority shareholders as part of the reform process is partly determined by the gains from improved risk sharing made possible by the reform, which removed the market friction that precluded certain shareholders from freely exchanging their shares. Relatedly, Firth, Lin, and Zou (2010) …nd that state ownership increases compensation, whereas mutual fund ownership decreases compensation, particularly in SOEs. That is, state shareholders both o¤er more compensation, to facilitate a rapid and smooth reform process, and pressure mutual funds to accept the o¤ered compensation. Relative to our study, both Li et al. (2011) and Firth, Lin, and Zou (2010) examine aspects of the reform process; we examine its outcomes.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the institutional environment that provides the setting for our analysis and the development of our hypotheses. Section 2 describes the data and our main empirical results; Section 3 summarizes additional analyses; and Section 4 concludes.
Institutional Background and Hypothesis Development 1.1 Institutional background
In 2005, a government-mandated reform eliminated the two-tier share structure in Chinese-listed companies that distinguished between tradable and nontradable common shares; this reform is described in detail in, for example, Li et al. (2011) . In the two-tier share structure, tradable shares were issued to investors, typically, small shareholders, through the IPO subscription process at government-approved IPO prices, typically 12-15 times earnings, whereas nontradable shares were issued to the government (for former state-owned enterprises) or the founders (for private companies) and their a¢ liates, often for a nominal price of 1 RMB per share. Nontradable shares account for the majority of shares issued at the IPO; before the reform almost all controlling shareholders in our sample …rms held nontradable shares (the sample average ownership is 47% 
Hypothesis development
Research proposes that corporate cash holdings are mainly determined by business environments (operational determinants) and by governance arrangements and agency con ‡icts. In the absence of agency con ‡icts, …rms (in the neoclassical sense, where each …rm operates as a single economic agent) will choose their cash holdings to maximize …rm values given their underlying business environments. With regard to operational determinants, research indicates that …rms that use more cash for payments and incur higher transaction costs from converting noncash …nancial assets to cash will hold more cash, to facilitate transacting (Baumol 1952; Miller and Orr 1966) . Similarly, …rms with relatively greater investment opportunities or those who face more costly or more constrained access to capital markets will also hold more cash, again, for operational reasons. 5 These factors have been examined by, for example, Opler et al. (1999) , Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009), and Duchin (2010) .
With regard to governance-related determinants, misaligned incentives of corporate insiders and outsiders can cause corporate cash holdings to deviate from the levels that would be observed if only operational determinants were at work. We consider two related channels through which governance-related considerations a¤ect cash holdings. First, the free cash ‡ow channel links insiders' incentives directly to cash holdings.
Speci…cally, if corporate cash holdings are chosen to meet the needs and wishes of insiders and not to maximize shareholder value, we expect, as discussed by Jensen (1986) , that …rms will hold excess cash, relative to amounts needed for operational and investment purposes. Second, the …nancing channel links insiders' incentives to cash holdings through …nancing constraints. Whereas the operational determinants literature predicts that …rms facing …nancial constraints would hold more cash than the amounts needed if the …-nancial constraints were relaxed, the presence of misaligned incentives will exacerbate these e¤ects, because external suppliers of capital will be reluctant to provide capital to …rms with agency problems. Although …nancial constraints, alone, would be expected to increase cash holdings, agency con ‡icts within …nancially constrained …rms will, we predict, increase cash holdings even further, by adding to the …nancing di¢ culties already present. Put another way, incentive misalignment can intensify the e¤ects of existing …nancial constraints to the extent that outside investors are disinclined to invest in …rms beset by agency con ‡icts (i.e., badly governed …rms). Therefore, governance arrangements that increase incentive alignment and reduce agency con ‡icts can lead to lower cash holdings through a direct cash ‡ow channel, by mitigating the Jensen free cash ‡ow problem, and through an indirect …nancial constraints channel, by reducing the agency-cost-induced intensi…cation of …nancial constraints.
The split share reform in China reduced a substantial market friction and thereby facilitated a better alignment of the interests of the controlling shareholders (holders of previously nontradable shares) with those of the outside minority investors (holders of tradable shares). The ability to sell their shares on exchanges and thereby realize the bene…ts of stock price appreciation gives the controlling shareholders incentives to care about share values, which in turn increases their incentives to take value-maximizing actions for the …rm as a whole, including reducing or eliminating their expropriating behaviors. Following this reasoning, we predict that cash holdings of Chinese-listed companies will decline after the 2005 reform. We state this prediction in alternative form as follows:
H1: The average postreform cash holding is lower than the average pre-reform cash holding.
We also investigate how the e¤ect of reform on cash holdings varies cross-sectionally with …rm-speci…c characteristics that capture agency con ‡icts and …nancial constraints. Firms with more severe agency con ‡icts will experience the e¤ects of the share reform through the free cash ‡ow channel; we predict larger decreases in cash holdings in …rms with more severe agency con ‡icts before the reform, because they are more likely to bene…t directly from the reform. Firms with more severe …nancial constraints will experience the e¤ects of the share reform through the (indirect) …nancial constraints channel; we predict larger decreases in cash holdings for …rms facing more severe …nancial constraints, because they are more likely to bene…t from better access to outside capital. We summarize this second prediction below.
H2:
The reduction in cash holdings in the postreform period is greater for …rms with more governance problems and for …rms with more …nancial constraints before the reform.
We provide additional analyses of the channels through which the share reform a¤ects corporate cash holdings and of two outcome indicators of the cash-policy-related e¤ects of the reform: the propensity of …rms to save cash, and investors'valuations of cash holdings. With regard to the former, our hypotheses are based on the premise that the e¤ects of the share reform on cash holdings operate through either or both the free cash ‡ow channel and the …nancial constraints channel, and that one or the other channel would be relatively more important for …rms with more governance problems and more …nancial constraints. We also expect that most or all of our sample …rms would be a¤ected through both channels, because they would experience at least some agency con ‡icts that would be (at least) partially reduced by the reform. However, the reform-induced governance improvement would be expected to lead to di¤erent outcomes, depending on …rm-speci…c circumstances. As explained in more detail in Section 3, …rms whose pre-reform excess cash holdings were held mostly to bene…t controlling shareholders, not for operational or investing purposes, are predicted to reduce cash holdings and pay out more cash to investors, with little or no impact on …nancing or investing decisions. In contrast, …rms that held excess cash as a response to …nancial constraints that were exacerbated by agency problems are predicted to reduce cash holdings, increase borrowing and increase investment. With regard to outcome indicators of the cash ‡ow e¤ects of the reform, we expect that …rms will save less of the cash they generate from operations, and that investors'valuation of cash holdings will increase. We analyze these predictions empirically in Sections 2 and 3. Table 1 in Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) Because our sample …rms completed the conversion of nontradable shares to tradable shares at di¤erent calendar times, we are able to apply a di¤erence-in-di¤erences method to identify the e¤ect of the reform separately from time-speci…c changes. In a given year, some sample …rms have completed the conversion (the treatment group) and other sample …rms have not (the control group). Both groups experience the same time-speci…c changes so the di¤erences in their cash holdings provide an estimate of the e¤ect of the share reform on cash holdings. We estimate the following equation to test H1:
Empirical Analysis
where t and i are dummies for year and …rm, respectively. Ref orm i;t is an indicator variable equal to one if …rm i has …nished the reform by year t. The year dummies control for calendar-year-speci…c e¤ects. The …rm …xed e¤ects dummies control for time-invariant unobservable …rm-speci…c characteristics;
in untabulated analysis, we obtain qualitatively similar results when we use industry …xed e¤ects instead of …rm …xed e¤ects. X i;t is the set of control variables that determine the normal level of cash holdings.
We cluster all standard errors at the …rm level to control for an arbitrary …rm-level correlation structure;
therefore the e¤ective number of observations is the number of unique …rms.
Based on prior research (e.g., Opler et al. 1999) , X i;t includes the following control variables: LogSales i;t (size, the logarithm of total sales revenues), OP CF i;t (operating cash ‡ow scaled by total noncash assets), N ET W C i;t (net working capital, the di¤erence between current noncash assets and current liabilities, scaled by total noncash assets), CAP EX i;t (capital expenditures scaled by total noncash assets), Age i;t (number of years since the …rm's IPO), M 2B i;t (the ratio of market value to book value of equity), and CashV ol i;t (the standard deviation of cash from operations across all …rms in the same industry each year). 8 These variables control for normal cash holdings to meet operational and investment needs. We include an indicator variable equal to one for …rms experiencing two consecutive years of losses (Dum_ST i;t ). Chinese stock exchanges designate as ST (for special treatment) …rms with two consecutive years of losses; a …rm with three years of losses is subject to potential delisting. We also include …nancing-related variables: Leverage i;t (total liabilities to noncash assets ratio), Dividend i;t (an indicator variable equal to one if a cash dividend is paid in year t), SEO i;t (an indicator variable equal to one if the …rm completed a seasoned equity issuance including a rights o¤ering in the preceding four years), and IP O i;t (an indicator variable equal to 1 in the IPO year and the year after). Finally, we include an indicator variable (SOE i;t ) equal to one if the controlling shareholder is a state-owned enterprise or government agency, in which case we refer to the …rm as an SOE;
otherwise, we refer to it as a private (non-SOE) …rm. Unless otherwise noted, all variables are measured on a …rm-year basis; we omit the subscripts i and t for notational ease. Table 2 tabulates results from estimating (1). Column 1 shows the main result. The coe¢ cient for the reform indicator variable is 0:0274 (t-statistic = 2.75, signi…cant at better than the 1% level, twotailed). This result is consistent with the prediction that the share reform results in smaller cash holdings, after controlling for cash holdings to meet operational/investing needs ("normal" cash holdings); that is, the reform results in reduced levels of excess corporate cash. The magnitude of this e¤ect is economically signi…cant: 0:0274 represents an 11.7% (= 2.74/23.5) reduction from the sample average pre-reform cash level of 23.5%, suggesting that prior to the reform, close to 12% of cash holdings by Chinese-listed companies
were due to problems that were partially or wholly resolved by the share reform.
In Column both are signi…cant at better than the 1% level. In terms of economic magnitude, the sample average prereform cash holdings for private …rms and SOEs are 25.9% and 22.8%, respectively, indicating that the share reform reduces cash holdings by 18.6% (= 4.83/25.9) for private …rms and by 7.3% (= (4.83-3.17)/22.8)
for SOEs. These results indicate that private …rms reduced their cash holdings more than SOEs did after the share reform. This di¤erence in how the reform a¤ected cash holdings is not unexpected given that the controlling shareholders of SOEs are government agencies whose primary objective may be something other than maximizing returns, including private returns. In Section 3, we report the results of additional analyses of the reasons for reductions in cash holdings at private …rms and SOEs.
Because all regressions in Table 2 The coe¢ cients for Af ter 0 and Af ter 1 are reliably negative at the 1.2% level or better; the coe¢ cient on
Af ter 0 is -0.0366 (t-statistic = 2.68) and the coe¢ cient on Af ter 1 is -0.0320 (t-statistic = 2.51). The coe¢ cient for Af ter 2 is negative ( 0:0108) but not signi…cant at conventional levels. These results support the interpretation that the reform results in meaningful reductions in the cash holdings of a¤ected …rms, after controlling for cash needed to meet operational/investing needs, and the e¤ect persists for at least one year after the reform.
Although it is not our main focus of our paper, Table 2 also provides information about the operating and investing determinants of cash holdings in Chinese-listed companies. These determinants are largely consistent with those identi…ed using U.S. data (e.g., Opler et al. 1999) . For example, LogSales has a negative coe¢ cient of -0.0246 (t-statistic = 3.15), consistent with the transactions motive for holding cash:
Large companies hold relatively less cash because of economies of scale. The coe¢ cient estimate for CashV ol is 0:574 (t-statistic = 2.94), consistent with the view that …rms with more volatile cash ‡ows hold more cash.
Inferences from results in other columns are similar.
Cross-sectional variation in the e¤ects of share reform on cash holdings
As discussed earlier, governance arrangements can a¤ect cash holdings through a direct cash ‡ow channel, by reducing the cash accumulated to meet the needs and demands of self-interested insiders, and through an indirect …nancial constraints channel, in which the reduction of agency con ‡icts makes outside creditors and investors more willing to provide capital. To further explore these two e¤ects and to test our sec-ond hypothesis, we modify Equation (1) to include variables that capture agency problems and …nancial constraints:
where Z i refers to variables that capture agency problems and …nancial constraints for …rm i before the reform. Because Z i is measured as a …rm-speci…c average over pre-reform years for each sample …rm i, we do not include Z i on its own in the presence of the …rm …xed e¤ects. In untabulated results, we obtain qualitatively similar results when we use Z i;t instead of Z i (there we include Z i;t on its own). Hypothesis 2 predicts that b > 0 when higher values of Z measure less severe pre-reform agency problems and …nancial constraints.
We use two …rm-speci…c measures of the severity of agency con ‡icts prior to the reform, M onitor i , and RP T i : M onitor i captures monitoring intensity by large shareholders other than controlling shareholders.
Large shareholders have both the incentive to monitor insiders'behavior (because they have more at stake) and the ability to do so (because of their voting power/resources). On the other hand, large shareholders' monitoring e¤ectiveness will be attenuated if they face a free rider problem (Shleifer and Vishny 1986 ). We measure M onitor i as the product of total shares (as a percentage of total shares outstanding) held by the second to the …fth largest shareholders of …rm i and a Her…ndahl index for the concentration of shares among these shareholders, averaged over the pre-reform years. We expect stronger pre-reform monitoring in …rms whose largest shareholders (other than the controlling shareholder) collectively hold more shares, and these shares are held in a more concentrated way. To the extent that large shareholders'postreform monitoring incentives are not a¤ected by the ability to trade their shares, we expect a positive coe¢ cient estimate for To the extent that the reform reduces agency con ‡icts that intensify …nancial constraints, we also expect that the reform reduces cash holdings more for …rms with more severe pre-reform …nancial constraints. We measure these constraints using two proxy variables developed by previous research (e.g., Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach 2004) : …rm size, measured as total assets (in logarithm, LogT A i ), and number of years since the IPO (Age i ), both calculated as the average over the pre-reform years. The idea is that larger and older …rms are less likely to face …nancial constraints because they have more assets suitable for use as collateral and less information uncertainty about their operations and long-term viability. Studies using U.S. data (e.g., Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach 2004; Faulkender and Wang 2006) often measure …nancial constraints inversely using credit ratings and dividend policies (rated …rms and dividend-paying …rms are less …nancially constrained). However, because few domestically listed Chinese …rms had credit ratings before the share reform and because the CSRC requires listed …rms to pay dividends as a condition for issuing additional equity, neither measure has the same ability to capture …nancial constraints in our setting as it would in a U.S. setting. is the average cash holding prior to the reform). In other words, Table 2 shows that the reform reduces the average …rm's cash holding by 11.7%, as discussed earlier; a one-standard-deviation decrease in the value of M onitor i would be associated with a postreform decrease in cash holding of 15.3% (= 11.7% + 3.6%).
This result is consistent with the idea that …rms with less severe agency issues (as proxied by high values of M onitor i ) reduce their cash holdings relatively less after the reform. Similarly, in Column 2 the coe¢ cient estimate for RP T i is -0.0494 (t-statistic = 2.22), suggesting that a one-standard-deviation increase in RP T i of 0:312 (from Table 1 ) would increase the e¤ect of the reform from 11.7% to 18.3% (the incremental 6.6% is calculated as 0.312*4.94/23.5). To the extent that …rms with low values of M onitor i and high values of RP T i before the reform have higher levels of pre-reform agency con ‡icts and would therefore bene…t more from governance improvements induced by the reform, these coe¢ cient estimates support our second prediction.
Hypothesis 2 also predicts that the reform is associated with greater reductions in cash holdings in …rms with more severe pre-reform …nancial constraints. As reported in Panel B of Table 3 , results from this alternative speci…cation are largely consistent with those reported in Panel A. The estimated intercepts are negative and signi…cant at better than the 1% level in all columns, consistent with the result in Table 2 that the reform is associated with reductions in corporate cash holdings. Cross-sectionally, the coe¢ cient for M onitor i is 0.0845 (t-statistic = 1.85, signi…cant at the 6.5% level, two-tailed), larger than the estimate from Table 3 Table 3 .
Taken together, we interpret the results presented in Table 3 as supporting our predictions. First, the 2005 split share structure reform resulted a signi…cant decline in corporate cash holdings of a¤ected …rms.
Second, consistent with the view that the e¤ects of the share reform will be most pronounced for …rms with greater pre-reform agency con ‡icts, we …nd larger declines in cash holdings for …rms with less pre-reform shareholder monitoring and more pre-reform related-party transactions. Third, consistent with the view that the e¤ects of the reform will be most pronounced for …rms with greater pre-reform …nancial constraints, we …nd larger declines for smaller and younger …rms. Finally, including variables that capture operational and investing determinants of cash holdings yields results that are consistent with previous research. We also …nd larger reductions in cash holdings for private …rms than for SOEs, suggesting that the free cash ‡ow channel and the …nancial constraints channel may operate in di¤erent ways for these two types of …rms.
2.3 The e¤ects of the share reform on cash-to-cash ‡ow sensitivity
We now consider the impact of the reform on another aspect of cash management policies, speci…cally, the propensity to accumulate cash generated by operations. We predict that the e¤ects of the share reform through both the free cash ‡ow channel and the …nancial constraints channel will reduce the propensity to accumulate cash, as captured by the cash-to-cash ‡ow sensitivity measure developed in Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) . 12 We estimate the following equation:
where Cash i;t is the change in cash holdings from year t 1 to t for …rm i, scaled by noncash assets, OP CF i;t is operating cash ‡ow for …rm i in year t scaled by total noncash assets, T obinQ it 1 is a measure of Tobin's Q, calculated as the ratio of market value of assets (sum of market value of equity and book value of liabilities) to book value of assets, and LogT A i;t is the logarithm of the …rm's total assets in year t. t and i are year and …rm …xed e¤ects dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the …rm level. 0 estimates the cash-to-cash ‡ow sensitivity (CFS) in the pre-reform period, and 0 + 1 estimates the average CFS in the postreform period. 1 < 0 would indicate that the share reform reduces the propensity to save/accumulate cash out of operating cash ‡ows. In estimating (3), we exclude the year the reform is completed because we are interested in comparing CFS in the pre-reform period with CFS in the postreform period, and the reform year itself straddles two di¤erent regimes.
Results of this analysis are shown in Table 4 . In Column 1, the coe¢ cient estimate for 0 is 0:516 (t-statistic = 18.77), indicating that the average Chinese-listed company saves more than half its operating cash ‡ow prior to the reform. For comparison, the cash-to-cash ‡ow sensitivity for U.S. …rms as documented in Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) is around 0.06 for …nancially constrained …rms and statistically indistinguishable from zero for nonconstrained …rms. The high corporate savings rate in Chinese-listed companies has been noted in the …nancial press 13 and suggests that many Chinese …rms face …nancial constraints. Consistent with the view that the reform loosens …nancial constraints, the coe¢ cient estimate for 1 is 0:112 (t-statistic = 2.87), suggesting an average cash ‡ow savings rate of 40.4% (= 0.516 -0.112) in the postreform period. Column 2 adds three additional control variables: CAP EX, N ET W C, and
Leverage. This speci…cation models cash changes as a function of the sources and uses of cash, so the resulting equations are close to an accounting identity. Not surprisingly, the adjusted R 2 more than doubles in Column 2 as compared to Column 1. However, the coe¢ cient estimate for 1 does not change substantially.
For example, b 1 is 0:114 in Column 2, compared to 0:112 in Column 1. The standard error estimate for b 1 is smaller, and the resulting t-statistic is larger when we add more regressors, as they help explain more of the variation in the dependent variable.
14 Columns 3-6 report the results of estimating (3) Results are similar when we add additional control variables (Column 4). For the private …rms, Columns 5-6 show a pre-reform savings rate of around 47.1%. The reform reduces the savings rate in both columns; the reduction is not signi…cant at conventional levels in Column 5, which does not include control variables, and the reduction is signi…cant at the 4.3% level (t-statistic = 2.02) when we include control variables (Column 6). The coe¢ cient estimates unconditional on control variables in Column 5 suggest that the savings rate dropped by 19.9% (= 0.0938/0.471), and those in Column 6 suggest a drop of more than 30% (= 0.143/0.471). We interpret the results in Table 4 as providing evidence that the share reform provided economic bene…ts by inducing …rms to accumulate less excess cash provided by operations.
Robustness analysis 2.4.1 Sensitivity to endogenous timing choice
A key assumption of the di¤erence-in-di¤erences identi…cation strategy is that the timing of the reform is exogenous to …rms' cash policies. We believe this is a reasonable assumption for two reasons. First, the nature of the reform and the way the reform was implemented did not allow much discretion as to timing. The reform was mandatory; the CSRC set August 2005 as the start date and the end of 2006 as the deadline for all …rms (privately owned or state-owned) to …nish the reform (Firth, Lin, and Zou 2010) .
The CSRC and stock exchanges also restricted the number of …rms starting the reform at any given time.
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The mandatory nature of the reform also implies that the actual timing of the reform depends largely on the time required to implement its procedures (e.g., the time it took to communicate with shareholders and obtain the necessary votes would a¤ect the reform timing). We believe these factors both a¤ect the reform timing and are exogenous to …rms'cash policies.
Governmental restrictions notwithstanding, …rms in principle had some limited discretion about when to start the share reform process. If early adoptions are driven by considerations related to cash policy, the coe¢ cient estimate on Ref orm in the main speci…cation (Equation (1), Table 2 We consider timing determinants that are related to the procedural aspects of the reform, or that capture the reform's bene…t unrelated to cash policies. To capture procedural aspects, we include an indicator variable for whether the controlling shareholder holds more than two-thirds of all nontradable shares (Dummy_2=3) to control for the fact that the reform would not start until at least two-thirds of the nontradable shareholders agree on a compensation plan for the tradable shareholders; the percentage of shares owned by government agencies (%State) to control for the complex and lengthy procedures for government owners to approve the reform proposal; an indicator variable to identify special treatment (ST) …rms (Dum_ST ) because ST …rms are subject to additional oversight by the stock exchanges; and the percentage of shares held by mutual funds (%Inst) as Firth, Lin, and Zou (2010) argue that institutional investors (who hold tradable shares)
are more likely to be persuaded or coerced into accepting the nontradable shareholders'proposals.
On the bene…ts side, we include the percentage of shares that are nontradable (%N onT radable), based on the idea that when many shares are nontradable, lifting the trading constraint bene…ts more shareholders.
We also include a measure of idiosyncratic risk (RetV ol, calculated as the standard deviation of the residuals from a market model estimation using the …rm's daily returns over 2004) to capture the risk sharing bene…ts of the reform discussed in Li et al. (2011) . Except for Dum_ST , which captures both (poor) …rm performance and the procedural complications, the timing determinants are not (directly) related to operations. Including too many operations-related variables, which may also capture the governance-related bene…ts of the reform, would underestimate the e¤ect of the reform on cash. That said, in a sensitivity test, we include size (LogSales 2004 ) as a catch-all variable for bene…ts in Equation (4) as a timing determinant and obtain results similar to those reported in tables (results not tabulated).
We verify the validity of the timing factors by estimating a duration model, where the dependent variable is the hazard rate and the duration is measured as the number of months or years between August 2005 (when the reform was o¢ cially formalized and mandated) and when a …rm entered the reform process.
Results (not tabulated) are that the coe¢ cient estimates for Dummy_2=3, %State, %N onT radable and RetV ol are all reliably di¤erent from zero at the 10% level or better in most speci…cations. These results con…rm our assumption that procedural aspects of the reform a¤ect the timing of reform.
The results from estimating (4) are presented in Columns 4-6 of We interpret these results as supporting our assumption that the share reform provided an exogenous governance shock, and we conclude that our main …nding-that the share reform led to an economically meaningful reduction in excess cash holdings-is not sensitive to endogenous choices by …rms as to when to undertake the reform. (2003), Kalcheva and Lins (2007) , and Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2008) . This approach uses observable, contemporaneous changes in variables to estimate the "normal" level of cash holdings, that is, the level necessary for operational needs, and uses the residuals as proxies for "excess" cash holdings; …rm-and year-…xed e¤ects are included to control for unobservable …rm-or time-speci…c factors.
Sensitivity to alternative speci…cation

When the reform timing di¤ers across …rms, the estimated coe¢ cient for Ref orm is interpretable as the causal e¤ect of the reform on corporate cash holdings. In this approach, including Ref orm T imingF actors
can correct the potential bias introduced by endogenous timing choices as discussed earlier.
To gauge the sensitivity of our results to the linear estimation approach, we estimate the e¤ect of the reform using a matching estimator. 16 The idea is to compare the cash holdings of a treatment …rm (that has …nished the reform as of year t) with the average cash holdings of comparable …rms with similar characteristics (that have not …nished the reform as of year t), measuring the characteristics as of 2004, before the reform began. This approach controls for unobservable time-…xed e¤ects. Unlike the linear regression approach, the matching estimator does not restrict the relation between control variables and cash to be linear. Matching …rms based on pre-reform characteristics also reduces complications associated with the possibility that some control variables might be a¤ected by the share reform. The potential bias from endogenous timing choices can be addressed by including the timing factors (from Equation (4)) in the matching criteria. To control for unobservable …rm-…xed e¤ects, we use the annual change in cash as the dependent variable. The e¤ect of the reform on cash is calculated as the di¤erence between the treatment …rms'changes in cash and the weighted average of control …rms'changes in cash, weighted by control …rms'propensity scores based on the control variables included in the main regression (i.e., Equation (1)).
The average e¤ects of the reform on cash holdings, using the matching estimation, are presented in Panel A of Table 5 . Column 1 shows that the average postreform cash level declines by 3.12% (t-statistic = 6.97), or about 13.3% (= 3.12/23.5) of the average cash holding, a magnitude similar to the 11.7% reduction implied by the linear regression estimates from Table 2 . The reduction in SOEs'cash holdings, shown in Column 2, is 2.86% (t-statistic = 6.14)), a relative reduction of 12.5% (= 2.86/22.8, where 22.8% is the sample average pre-reform SOE cash holding). The e¤ect of the reform on private …rms'cash holdings, shown in Column 3, is 3.68% (t-statistic = 3.72), a 14.4% reduction in the average private …rm's cash holdings (= 3.68/25.9, where 25.9% is the average cash holding of private …rms).
Panel B of Table 5 presents evidence on cross-sectional variation in the e¤ects of the share reform based on the matching estimator. We regress the change in cash due to the reform on M onitor, RP T , LogT A, and Age; the coe¢ cient estimates for M onitor and Age are 0.0963 (t-statistic = 2.64) and 0.0075 (t-statistic = 5.60), respectively. The magnitudes of these estimates are comparable to those estimated by the linear approach and reported Panels A and B of Table 3 . However, unlike the linear regression results, the coe¢ cient estimates for RP T and LogT A are statistically indistinguishable from zero.
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To summarize, our main …ndings are that Chinese-listed …rms reduced their cash holdings in conjunction with the split share structure reform, and these reductions are more pronounced in …rms with more severe agency con ‡icts and more stringent …nancial constraints prior to the reform. These results are robust to the endogenous timing choice and the matching estimator.
Sensitivity to alternative explanations
We consider two alternative explanations for our main …ndings that attribute the e¤ect of the reform to changes in business environments or changes in investment opportunities. The business environment explanation posits that the reform merely provides the a¤ected …rms with access to cash, by allowing controlling shareholders to sell their shares and use the cash proceeds to …nance the listed …rms. This explanation suggests a larger postreform reduction in cash holdings in …rms with more severe …nancial constraints, as in Hypothesis 2. However, this explanation also presumes complete incentive alignment between the controlling shareholders and the listed …rm, e¤ectively equating additional postreform …nancing to controlling shareholders with additional …nancing to the listed …rm. Under this explanation, the reform reduces cash holdings more in …rms whose controlling shareholders have a larger percentage ownership, because incentive alignment issues are less of a concern for these shareholders and because they have more shares to sell.
We test this explanation by re-estimating Equation (1) These results are inconsistent with the alternative explanation. In fact, to the extent that lower holdings by controlling shareholders indicate agency con ‡icts, so that the reform improves incentive alignment more in these …rms, these results are consistent with our primary hypothesis.
If the reform a¤ects …nancial constraints for reasons unrelated to governance improvements, there should be no di¤erences in the reduction in the cash-to-cash ‡ow sensitivity across subsamples of …rms partitioned by pre-reform measures of agency con ‡icts. Instead, reductions in cash-to-cash ‡ow sensitivity (CFS) should be larger in …rms with more …nancial constraints. To test this explanation, we re-estimate Equation (3) Together, these results are not consistent with the hypothesis that the reform relaxes …nancial constraints for reasons unrelated to governance.
The second alternative explanation is that negative shocks to investment opportunities around the time of the reform induce …nancially constrained …rms to reduce both their cash holdings and their tendency to accumulate cash generated from operations (measured as the cash-to-cash ‡ow sensitivity) in response to those shrinking investment opportunities. Given China's 8% to 11.4% GDP growth rate during our sample period, it seems unlikely that Chinese-listed …rms faced limited investment opportunities in general. Further, this explanation predicts a postreform reduction in both investment and the market valuation of corporate cash holdings. However, we …nd that on average investment increased after the reform (tabulated in Column 1 of Table 7 , Panel A, and discussed next), and the average market valuation of cash also increased after the reform (results are untabulated); both results are inconsistent with the shrinking-investment-opportunity explanation.
E¤ects of the Reform on Firm Decisions and Performance
Our results that both the level of cash holdings and the cash savings rate decline after the split share reform are consistent with the view that governance arrangements have a meaningful e¤ect on corporate cash policies. As discussed earlier, these e¤ects can operate via either the free cash ‡ow channel or the …nancial constraint channel. These channels are not mutually exclusive, as most of our sample …rms experience some degree of agency con ‡icts and some degree of …nancial constraint; they are related, in that agency con ‡icts exacerbate the e¤ects of existing …nancial constraints; and they have di¤erent implications for post-sharereform investment and …nancing decisions. In this section, we explore these implications.
From the perspective of maximizing …rm value, the free cash ‡ow channel implies that the pre-reform cash holding was suboptimal because excess cash was held simply for the bene…t of controlling shareholders.
In the most extreme case, …rms experience no frictions other than insiders' desire to hoard cash for their personal bene…t, implying that the excess cash served no operational or investing purpose and could have been paid out to investors, but for insiders'cash hoarding incentives. Under this scenario, when the share reform reduces insiders'cash hoarding incentives, we expect lower cash holdings and increased cash payouts to investors, but little or no change in investments. In contrast, the …nancial constraint channel implies that pre-reform cash holdings were excessive because agency problems exacerbated the cash-holdings e¤ects of any existing …nancial constraints. This channel implies that when the reform loosened …nancial constraints, we should observe lower cash holdings and increases in both capital expenditures and external …nancing.
Both channels predict improved performance.
To analyze the e¤ects of the reform on …rms' cash payout, investment, and borrowing decisions, we estimate the following regression:
where Y i;t is either performance as measured by return on assets (ROA), or one of three …rm choices: the investment decision as measured by capital expenditure (CAP EX); payout policy as measured by dividend payout ratio (Div=Earnings); and …nancing policy as measured by total debt (T otalDebt); short-term debt (ST Debt), and long-term debt (LT Debt). Other than the dividend payout ratio, variables are scaled by noncash assets. Controls i;t is vector of control variables including a proxy for Tobin's Q (T obinQ), operating cash ‡ows (OP CF ), and logarithm of total assets (LogT A), and t and i capture time-and …rm-…xed e¤ects. As before, standard errors are clustered at the …rm level and are adjusted for heteroscedasticity. Columns 3-4 use ROA as the dependent variable. In Column 3, the coe¢ cient estimate for Ref orm .27) and 0.0330 (t-statistic = 4.07), respectively. These estimates imply that the average short-term debt to net asset ratio in private …rms declined by 2.69% in absolute magnitude and by 11.6% in relative terms (= 2.69/23.1, where 23.1% is the pre-reform sample average short term debt ratio for private …rms). In contrast, the sample SOEs increased their short term debt by 0.61% (= 0.0330 -0.0269) in absolute terms and by 3.3% relatively (= 0.61/18.4, where 18.4% is the sample average short term debt ratio for SOEs). Columns 5-6 show no evidence of changes in long-term debt in either private …rms or SOEs. In interpreting these results, it is important to keep in mind that short-term debt is the predominant form of debt …nancing for
Chinese …rms (the sample average long-term debt is 6.4% of total assets, about one-third of the short-term debt).
In untabulated results, we …nd that investors increase their valuations of cash holdings after the reform, for both SOEs and private …rms. Prior to the reform, investors value SOEs'cash holding positively but do not assign signi…cant value to cash held in private …rms, consistent with the idea that private …rms are more likely to hold cash for controlling shareholders'use than for operational and investment purposes.
Together, these results suggest that the reasons for excess cash holdings di¤er between private …rms and SOEs. Our interpretation is that before the share reform, private …rms are more likely to hold cash to meet the needs and wishes of controlling shareholders, and the reform induces reductions in cash holdings directly, by better aligning controlling shareholders'incentives with those of the minority shareholders. In contrast, corporate insiders/controlling owners in SOEs face relatively more constraints in their incentives and abilities to direct corporate resources for personal use because they themselves are organizations with their own sets of internal controls. 18 Consistent with this perspective, our …ndings suggest that pre-reform cash holdings at SOEs are more likely a response to …nancial constraints that are exacerbated by pre-reform agency problems, and the reform induces reductions in cash holdings indirectly, by reducing the agency-costrelated intensi…cation of …nancial constraints. 
Conclusion
We analyze the change in cash holdings of a large sample of Chinese-listed …rms associated with the split share structure reform that required nontradable shares held by controlling shareholders to be converted to tradable shares, subject to shareholder approval and adequate compensation to tradable shareholders.
The reform removed a substantial market friction and gave controlling shareholders a clear incentive to care about share prices, because they could bene…t from share value increases by selling some of their shares for cash. We predict and …nd that this governance improvement led to reduced cash holdings of a¤ected …rms, and that the e¤ect is more pronounced for private …rms than for state-owned enterprises (SOEs), for …rms with more agency con ‡icts, and …rms for which …nancial constraints are most binding. We interpret these results as consistent with both a direct free cash ‡ow channel and an indirect …nancial constraint channel.
These results are robust to several alternative speci…cations that address concerns about endogeneity and concomitant e¤ects. They provide strong evidence that governance arrangements a¤ect …rms'cash holdings and cash management behaviors. To the extent that cash management is a key operational decision that a¤ects …rm value, our …ndings suggest an important mechanism for corporate governance to a¤ect …rm value.
Our analyses of postreform …rm behaviors …nd that private …rms increased cash payouts but not external debt …nancing or capital expenditures; we interpret this …nding as consistent with a relatively more pronounced free cash ‡ow channel e¤ect that reduced the incentives of private …rm controlling shareholders to hoard the listed …rm's cash as a reservoir for their personal cash needs and a relatively less pronounced …nancial constraints channel. In contrast, the SOEs increased both external debt …nancing and capital expenditures, consistent with the operation of the …nancial constraints channel; SOEs also increased dividend payouts but not by as much as did private …rms.
We draw two important implications from our results. The …rst is that the liquidity of large shareholders matters, in that our results are based on a natural experiment that improves corporate governance arrangements by relaxing trading constraints imposed on large shareholders. The second implication from our analyses of the relative e¤ects on private …rms and SOEs is that ownership matters, in that the free cash ‡ow channel appears more descriptive of the governance path taken by the share reform in private …rms and the …nancial constraint channel appears more descriptive for the SOEs. We attribute this di¤erence in e¤ects to important di¤erences in the two types of owners. Speci…cally, controlling shareholders of private …rms-persons and families-have both the ability and the incentive to use corporate cash for personal needs while controlling shareholders of SOEs-government agencies-are themselves organizations whose employees are subject to organizational controls. The nature of the agency con ‡ict, and therefore its partial resolution by the share reform, di¤ers for the two types of …rms because their owners di¤er. results if we use …rm-speci…c stock return volatility.
9 Bertrand and Mullaianathan (2003) use a similar speci…cation to assess the direction of causality between the passage of state-level business combination laws in the United States and changes in wages, employment, and investment. 10 We thank the referee for bringing up this point.
11 Chinese accounting standards require that each listed company disclose the amount and nature of all transactions between the company and its parent (the controlling shareholders) or a¢ liates controlled by the parent. To the extent that related-party transactions occur for reasons other than tunneling, RP T i measures agency con ‡icts with error that should bias against …nding results. We obtain results similar to those reported in the tables from scaling average related-party transactions by total assets, or from using a dummy variable for the existence of RPT (results not tabulated).
similar results (not tabulated). 18 As described in Lin, Cai, and Li (1998) , a lack of managerial autonomy in SOEs points to shirking as an agency problem, but not consumption of corporate resources. 19 These results suggest that overtime changes in cash holdings from before to after the reform mostly operate via the …nancial constraints channel for the SOEs and via the free cash ‡ow channel for the private …rms. They do not imply that at a given point in time SOEs face more …nancial constraints than do private …rms. 
NETWC
Difference between current noncash assets and current liabilities, scaled by noncash assets.
CashVol
Standard deviation of cash from operations across firms in the same industry.
CAPEX
Capital expenditures, scaled by noncash assets. Age
The number of years since the firm was listed on the exchange.
M2B
Ratio of market value to book value of equity.
IPO
Indicator variable for the year of and the year after the IPO.
Dividend
Indicator variable that equals one if firm i paid cash dividends in year t. SEO Indicator variable that equals one if firm i issued seasoned equity in the preceding four years.
Dum_ST
Indicator variable that equals one if firm i has losses in the preceding two years.
SOE
Indicator variable that equals one if the controlling shareholder is a government agency.
TobinQ
Ratio of market value to book value of assets; market value of assets is proxied by market value of equity plus book value of total liabilities. ExRet Annual stock return of firm i in excess of the average industry return in year t. ROA Ratio of after-tax operating income to noncash assets.
Div/Earnings
Dividend payments scaled by earnings.
TotalDebt
Total interest bearing debt scaled by noncash assets.
STDebt
Short-term interest bearing debt scaled by noncash assets.
LTDebt
Long-term interest bearing debt scaled by noncash assets. Table 1 for definitions of all other variables. All variables are measured by firm-year except those with the subscript i, which are calculated as the firm-specific average over the pre-reform years. In all regressions, year-and firm-fixed effects are included, and standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and within-cluster correlation among all observations belonging to the same firm. The coefficient estimates for the control variables are not tabulated and are available from the authors upon request. In Panel B, the dependent variable is the change in the average excess cash for each firm from pre-reform periods to postreform periods. Average excess cash for each period is the average of the residuals from estimating Equation (1) using the entire sample (excluding the dummy variable Reform) for each firm over each period. The independent variables are calculated as the firm-specific average over the pre-reform years. Absolute values of t-statistics are shown in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at equal to or less than the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Cross-sectional variation in the effect of the reform on cash holdings Table 1 for variable definitions). We calculate the difference between the change in cash in the treatment firm and the change in the control firms. Panel A shows the sample averages of these differences in the whole sample and in the subsamples of SOEs and private firms (non-SOE). Panel B shows results regressing the difference in cash change between the control firms and the treatment firms on firm-specific variables calculated based on their 2004 values. Year dummies are included in the regression, and the coefficient estimates not tabulated. Absolute values of t-statistics are shown in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at equal to or less than the 1%, 5% ,and 10% levels, respectively. Table 6 . Effect of the reform on cash holdings and cash-to-cash flow sensitivity on subsamples
The dependent variable in Panel A is in Cash, defined as the ratio of cash holdings scaled by noncash assets for firm i in year t. Reform it is a dummy variable that equals one if firm i has completed the share reform by year t. See Table 1 for definitions of all other variables. Panel A estimates Equation (1) in the main text on subsamples of firms partitioned by controlling shareholders' holdings. Column 1 (2) is estimated for the subsample of firms where the controlling shareholders hold more (less) than 50% of the shares prior to the reform. Column 3 (4) is estimated for the subsample of firms where the controlling shareholders' holdings are in the top (bottom) three deciles of all firms prior to the reform. Column 1 (2) of Panel B estimates Equation (3) in the main text on subsamples of firms with above (below) sample median values of Monitor. Column 3 (4) of Panel B estimates Equation (3) for the subsample of firms with above (below) sample median value of LogTA. For Panel B, observations from the year firms completed their reform are excluded. In all regressions in both panels, year-and firm-fixed effects are included and standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and within-cluster correlation among all observations belonging to the same firm. Absolute values of t-statistics are shown in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at equal to or less than the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The dependent variables are CAPEX (the ratio of capital expenditure to noncash assets) in Columns 1-2 of Panel A; ROA (the ratio of after-tax operating income to noncash assets) in Columns 3-4 in Panel A; Div/Earnings (the ratio of dividends paid to earnings) in Columns 5-6 in Panel A; Total, short-term, and long-term debt (calculated as the ratios of total, short-term and long-debt to noncash assets) in Columns 1-2, 3-4, and 5-6, respectively, in Panel B. Reform it is a dummy variable that equals one if firm i has completed the share reform by year t. See Table 1 for definitions of all other variables. In all regressions, year-and firm-fixed effects are included, and standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and within-cluster correlation among all observations belonging to the same firm. Absolute values of t-statistics are shown in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at equal to or less than the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
